Conscientious Objectors - Definition of Religious Belief - A Belief Which Occupies a Place in the Life of Its Possessor Parallel to That Ordinarily Filled by an Orthodox Belief in God Is a Religious Belief by Koon, Richard M.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 41 Issue 6 Article 4 
April 2021 
Conscientious Objectors - Definition of Religious Belief - A Belief 
Which Occupies a Place in the Life of Its Possessor Parallel to 
That Ordinarily Filled by an Orthodox Belief in God Is a Religious 
Belief 
Richard M. Koon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Richard M. Koon, Conscientious Objectors - Definition of Religious Belief - A Belief Which Occupies a 
Place in the Life of Its Possessor Parallel to That Ordinarily Filled by an Orthodox Belief in God Is a 
Religious Belief, 41 Denv. L. Ctr. J. 401 (1964). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
COMMENTS
is enough to take the devise out of the doctrine of worthier title. 2 3
Therefore, Jane B. Darling took not as heir, but as devisee. Since
the title which was quieted in Mary Sander was derived from Jane
B. Darling, the decision of this case included, by necessary infer-
ence, the first decision that a possibility of reverter was devisable
in Colorado.
24
Nothing pertaining to the devolution of a possibility of reverter
would be gained by a further study of the chain of title. The first
transfer, on June 4, 1930, required a holding that a possibility of re-
verter was inheritable in the ordinary manner in Colorado, and this
was expressly stated by the court. The next transfer on May 20,
1950, necessarily involved a decision that a possibility of reverter
was devisable in Colorado. The decision left unanswered the ques-
tion as to whether a possibility of reverter could be conveyed by
deed in Colorado, because there was no such transfer in this chain
of title until November 5, 1962, after the estate had reverted.
Thompson G. Marsh*
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS-DEFINITION OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF
-A BELIEF WHICH OCCUPIES A PLACE IN THE LIFE OF ITS POSSESSOR
PARALLEL TO THAT ORDINARILY FILLED BY AN ORTHODOX BELIEF IN
GOD IS A RELIGIOUS BELIEF. United States v. Seeger, 85 Sup. Ct.
850 (1965).
Daniel Seeger claimed exemption from military service as a
conscientious objector,1 but left open the question as to his belief
in a Supreme Being. He declared, however, that his agnostic phi-
losophy did "not necessarily mean lack of faith in a purely ethical
creed. ' '2 Although the government conceded that Seeger's abhor-
23 Harper & Heckel, supra note 20 at 639-640.
24 The applicable statute, COLO. STAT. ANNO. 1935, Ch. 176, § 36, said, "
shall have the power to . . . devise . . . any or all the estate, right, title
and interest in possession, reversion or remainder . . . of, in and to any
lands, tenements, heriditaments, annuities or rents charged upon or issuing
out of them . . . . COLO. REV. STAT. § 153-5-1 (1963) says, . . . may
devise . . . real . . . property or any interest therein .... .
*Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law.
1 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1951) : Seeger's claim was made under § 6(j) of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act:
Nothing contained in this title [§ § 451-454 and 455-471 of this Ap-
pendix] shall be construed to require any person to be subject to
combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Religious train-
ing and belief in this connection means an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code.
2 85 Sup. Ct. at 854.
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rence of war was both sincere and predicated on "religious training
and belief,' 3 the selective service board denied his claim solely on
the grounds that it was not based upon a "belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being" as required by § 6(j) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act.' Seeger was convicted in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York of having refused to
submit to induction in the armed forces. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the
Supreme Being requirement of the act violated the due process
clause of the fifth amendment by creating an impermissible class-
ification between internally derived and externally compelled
"religious" beliefs. 6 The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching
the constitutional issue, holding that "the test of belief 'in a rela-
tion to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere
and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qual-
ifies for the exemption.'",
Religious objectors have been provided with some form of
military exemption since 1775 when the First Continental Congress
passed a resolution to exempt those who, because of their "religious
principles," could not bear arms.s The Federal Conscription Law
of 1863" contained no such exemption but one was included in the
1864 Draft Law. 10 The Draft Act of 191711 restricted exemption to
members of "any well-recognized religious sect . . .whose existing
creed or principles [forbade] . . . its members to participate in
war in any form."'1 2 In 1940 Congress broadened the exemption
significantly by including not only members of the historic peace
churches but also individuals "who, by reason of religious training
and belief" are opposed to war in any form.13 The 1940 act was
modified in 194814 to include within the definition of "religious
training and belief" the requirement of "belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being" with which the Seeger case deals.
Although the Court of Appeals decided Seeger on constitution-
3 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1964).
4 85 Sup. Ct. at 854.5 United States v. Seeger, 216 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
6 United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964).
7 United States v. Seeger, 85 Sup. Ct. 850, 854 (1965).
8 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 189 (1905).
9 Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 2, 12 Stat. 731.
10 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9. The exemption extended to
conscientious objectors who were members of religious denominations pro-
hibited from bearing arms by the articles of faith of their denominations.
11 Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 76.
12 Id 40 Stat. at 78.
13 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
1450 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1951).
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al grounds,' the Supreme Court eschewed any constitutional de-
termination.16 Instead it chose to define the term "Supreme Being"
as something other than the orthodox concept of God. This defini-
tion served to resolve a conflict between the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits which existed between 1940 and 1948, and continued even
after Congress attempted to settle it in the 1948 amendment.
The conflict had its origin in 1943 in the broad definition of
"religious training and belief" supplied by Judge Augustus Hand
in United States v. Kauten.17 Hand said that "the provisions of the
present statute Ithe 1940 act] . . . take into account the character-
istics of a skeptical generation and make the existence of a con-
scientious scruple against war in any form, . . .the basis of exemp-
15 326 F.2d 846 (1965). The Court of Appeals had decided Seeger on the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.
16 The Supreme Court has thus far refused to consider the constitutionality
of the "religious training and belief" and "Supreme Being" provisions.
Etcheverry v. United States, 320 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
930 (1963) ; Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 843 (1952). However the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366
(1917), held that an even narrower religious exemption (see notes 8 and 9
and accompanying text supra) did not violate the guarantee of the first
amendment. Recent opinions of the Court contain language which indicates
that there is at least some doubt as to whether the Court will uphold the
Supreme Being test of § 456(j) against first amendment challenges when
it chooses to decide the question. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 217 (1962) ; Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) ; McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442-43 (1961) ; McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948) ; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
These decisions can be read to indicate that restricting the conscientious ob-
jector draft exemption to those who are "religious" and also who believe in a
"Supreme Being" would be unconstitutional as (1) aiding all religions, or
believers as against non-believers; (2) aiding religions based on belief in the
existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs,
grounds seemingly contrary to the prohibitions of Everson and Torcaso. See
Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of Torcaso
v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252 (1963).
17 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943). However, it should be noted that the language
concerning the definition of religion is no more than dictum, albeit per-
suasive since later cases have followed it. Kauten's appeal was turned
down on procedural grounds. See 133 F.2d at 705-06.
Experf * Commercial Printing
Brief Prinfers o Catalogues and Brochures
. Year Books- Magazines
THE * Books- Book BindingTHEe n * House Organs
AM 6-3277 2400 CURTIS STREET
AM -327 &~ei~j2 PRESS Deqver, Colorado
1964
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
tion."' ' He went on to say that religious belief under the act means
"a compelling voice of conscience," or "a response of the individual
to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God . ... "19 In a later
Second Circuit decision, United States ex. rel. Phillips v. Downer,2 0
absent the procedural infirmity which made the Kauten definition
dictum, Judge Clark reaffirmed the language of Kauten that a
''conscientious scruple against war in any form" is a sufficient basis
for exemption.2 1 In United States ex. rel. Reel v. Badt,22 the Second
Circuit again approved the Kauten language and held that opposi-
tion to war based on humanitarian considerations and not on any
obligation to a deity or supernatural power was sufficient to entitle
the registrant to a exemption.
23
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the reason-
ing of the Second Circuit and set forth a second, and narrower,
definition of "religion" in Berman v. United States.24 The court
said:
the expression "by reason of religious training and belief"
is plain language, and was written into the statute [the
1940 act] for the specific purpose of distinguishing be-
tween a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion
to a high moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an
individual's belief in his responsibility to an authority
higher and beyond any wordly one.25
The court concluded that the registrant's "philosophy and morals
and social policy without the concept of deity" does not qualify
as "religion" under § 5 (g).26 Religion, according to Berman, is "be-
lief in relation to God involving duties superior to those arising
1SId. at 708.
19 Ibid.
20 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
21 Id. at 524. At the same time, Judge Clark warned that if a stricter rule than
was announced in the Kauten case is called for, one demanding a belief
which cannot be found among the philosophers, but only among religious
teachers of recognized organizations, then we are substantially or nearly
back to the requirement of the Act of 1917.
22 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944). Mr. Justice Frankfurter also quoted the
Kauten language with approval in a dissenting opinion in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 658 (1943).
23 141 F.2d at 847.
24 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946). It is interesting
to note that the same procedural circumstances were present in Berman
that were present in Kauten but the United States Supreme Court, in Falbo
v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), had since decided that they did not
prevent the registrant from questioning the decision of the local draft and
appeal boards application of the "religious training and belief" requirement.
25 156 F.2d at 380.
26 Id. at 381.
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from any human relation, '2 7 while in Kauten, Downer, and Badt,
a conscientious scruple against war, not necessarily based on
any obligation to a deity, qualifies as "religion."
Congress apparently resolved the resultant dichotomy in 194828S
when it amended the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act. Con-
gress not only adopted the language from the Berman case nearly
word-for-word,2 9 but also expressly cited Berman . 0 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit accordingly held that an agnostic
could not be granted an exemption because his objections could
not be based on belief in a relation to a Supreme Being.3 1 However,
in United States v. Jakobson,32 the Second Circuit said that the
Supreme Being clause must be liberally interpreted to avoid con-
stitutional difficulties and continued to substantially follow its pre-
1948 views defining religion broadly.31 Despite the efforts of Con-
gress, the disparity in the definition of religion had been judicially
perpetuated. It was in this atmosphere that the Supreme Court
decided the Seeger case.
In Seeger, the Supreme Court purported to construe the words
of Congress in order to reach the conclusion that the "legislative
intent," as manifested in the language of the act, was to adopt a
broad definition of "religion" analogous to that applied in Kauten.
The Court determined that when Congress added the Supreme
Being qualification to the 1940 act it did so only to clarify its
original intent.3 4 According to the Court, the intent which Congress
felt obliged to clarify was not who was entitled to military exemp-
tion under the statute, but rather who was not so entitled.3 The
Court then concluded that the requirement of belief in a relation
27 Id. at 381, quoting the language of Mr. Justice Hughes in his dissent in
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931).
2862 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (1958).
29 The language of § 456 (j) declares that "religious training and belief" is to
be defined as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being in-
volving duties superior to those arising from any human relation ......
This language differs in only one particular from that in Berman, 156 F.2d
at 381, which in turn had been quoted from United States v. Macintosh,
283 U.S. 605 (1931). The statute contains the words "Supreme Being" in
place of the word "God" which appears in Berman and Macintosh.
30 S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948): "This exemption [ §
456(j) ] extends to anyone who, because of religious training and belief
in his relation to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously opposed to combatant
military service or to both combatant and non-combatant military service.
(See United States v. Berman, 156 F.2d 377, certiorari denied, 329 U.S.
795.)"
31 United States v. De Lime, 233 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1955).
32 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963). Jakobson, as well as Peter v. United States,
324 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1964), was decided by the Supreme Court as a com-
panion case to Seeger.
33 Id. at 413-14.
34 85 Sup. Ct. at 861.
35 Id. at 860.
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to a Supreme Being was not a restrictive test and a conscientious
objector could qualify for exemption even though he could not
avow a belief in a Supreme Being. 6 Consequently, the Supreme
Being requirement which caused Seeger's draft board to refuse
him an exemption 37 was judicially interpreted out of existence. It
seems to be stretching logic to conclude that Congress intended an
amendment to clear up an area where there was no disagreement
3 s
36 Id. at 854.
37 326 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1964).
38 See, e.g., Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 795 (1946) ; United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
The decisions agreed that exemption must be denied to those whose beliefs
were political, social, or philosophical in nature.
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and intended to ignore an area where there was a great deal of
conflict .31
In searching for the proper congressional intent to enable it
to avoid the constitutional issues, the Court decided that Congress
did not intend to solve any conflict between Berman and Kauten
because "if it [Congress] thought that two clashing interpretations
as to what amounted to 'religious belief' had to be resolved, it
would have said so somewhere in its deliberations. '40 The Court
minimized the fact that Congress in the 1948 amendment used,
almost word-for-word, 41 language from the Berman opinion.
42
Neither was the Court influenced by the Government's argument
that since Congress cited Berman in the Senate Report 4'3 Congress
intended to adopt the Berman definition of religion. The Court
avoided that construction by saying that the citation was for a dif-
ferent purpose: to reaffirm what was not, rather than what was,
a sufficient "religious belief" to qualify for exemption.4 4 This
conclusion, however, is of doubtful validity when the citation is
considered in the context in which it was made.45 The Court also
attempted to minimize the import of the citation by saying a mere
"parenthetical citation of a case which might stand for a number
of things"4 6 is outweighed by the "explicit statement of congress-
ional intent ' 47 that, "this section reenacts substantially the same
provisions as were found in subsection 5 (g) of the 1940 act."
48
Perhaps the most intellectually honest basis for the decision
was expounded by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in
which he said the case was just another instance "where we have
gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from
demise on constitutional grounds. ' '41 It would be accurate to say
that rather than finding what Congress's intent was, the Court
found what Congress's intent should have been.
The test established by the Court in Seeger directs the local
39 I.e., the Berman - Kauten conflict as to the definitions of "religion".
40 85 Sup. Ct. at 860.
41 See supra note 29.
42 85 Sup. Ct. at 859. The court did this by saying that the language used came
originally from United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), an earlier
opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes which the Court pointed out "supports
our interpretation." 85 Sup. Ct. at 860.
43 S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
44 85 Sup. Ct. at 860.
45 Supra note 30.
46 85 Sup. Ct. at 859.
47 Ibid.
48 85 Sup. Ct. at 857, quoting from S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1948).
49 85 Sup. Ct. at 865. See Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 433 (1956);
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 (1953) ; Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 341, 348 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
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draft boards and courts to "decide whether the beliefs professed
by a registrant are [1] sincerely held and [2] whether they are,
in his own scheme of things, religious." 50 A belief is "religious"
when it "occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption
.... "51 These beliefs may be either externally or internally de-
rived.52 The Court also gave approval to the portion of the act
which says that objection cannot be based on a "merely personal
moral code," 53 although its application may be limited by the
Court's statement that there can be no distinction "between ex-
ternally and internally derived beliefs.
'54
In spite of the broad interpretation the Supreme Court has
given § 456(j), two things are apparent. First, the Court is still
faced with the potential issue of whether § 456(j) violates the es-
tablishment clause of the first amendment, but that question can
be properly raised only by an atheist.5 5 If the statute is held to be
unconstitutional on that ground, Congress will have to draft an-
other exemption and avoid conditioning it on "religious beliefs."
Failure to provide any exemption could in turn be challenged as a
violation of the first amendment right to the free exercise of
religion. Second, those who must administer the act - the draft
boards and the courts - still must make two difficult determina-
tions from rather nebulous standards: (1) Is the applicant sincere?
(2) Are the applicant's objections based on a "religious belief" as
defined in Seeger? While the Court's decision in Seeger broadened
the definition of "religion," it certainly did not make the standards
for exemption any clearer. Resolution of both the constitutional
and administrative problems presented by § 6(j) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act could be realized if Congress
would grant a military service exemption to all those persons who
sincerely object to participation in war in any form. After Seeger,
the next step in the evolution of the conscientious objector exemp-
tion should be taken by the Legislature. However, it is doubtful
that Congress will choose to act.
56
Richard M. Koon
50 85 Sup. Ct. at 863.
51 Id. at 859.
52 Id. at 864.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 85 Sup. Ct. at 858.
56 The American Civil Liberties Union urged a somewhat similar non-religious
exemption in 1940 which was rejected by Congress. Hearings on S. 4164 Be-
fore the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. at 308
(1949).
VOL. XLI
